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Case No. 20080795-CA
IN THE

LrAIiCOLR'i OFAPPE.-iL.r

State oi Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

Mark D. Talbot,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for seven counts of distribution of a
controlled substance, two counts of possession oi J con ironed suDstance, and three
counts of possession ,\ .::u^ r \ , _ . \ ; - . :, .: ..•
pour , . * ; : * .

:._•• ./•|>.i:.:iionui ider the

- " * - . : - * 03' ?• :'. (West Si ipp. 2009).

•

STA TEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1, Defendant claims that his detention escalated into an unlawful arrest when
Officer Moore detained and arrested him without the authorization from Sheriff
: erkiiis. :i-j- di^-j? ih^t ;ho vwd.-rxv ..-: ineihjir^h, *a!";v-- ; .' ; -

. . ;-

:-v:>;.o

sliouH have Iv^n suppressed and ihjf the denial of his motion to suppress
constituted reversible error. Did the trial court properly deny the motion to
suppress when it determined that probable cause justified any detention,
whether a stop or an arrest?

Standard of Review. In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress,
the appellate court reviews the trial court's factual findings for clear error and its
conclusions of law for correctness. State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, Tf 11,162 P.3d
1106.
2. Should this Court review Defendant's voir dire claim, where Defendant
has not presented a record adequate to support it?
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this question.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provision is relevant to the issues on appeal:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by amended information with seven first degree
felony counts of distribution of a controlled substance, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (West Supp. 2006); one second degree felony and one
misdemeanor count of possession of a controlled substance, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (West Supp. 2006); and four misdemeanor counts of
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possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l)
(West 2004). R96-100.
During pre-trial proceedings, Defendant moved twice to suppress the
evidence. See R252-56,190-97. The trial court denied both motions. See R103-05;
233-40.
A jury found Defendant guilty of the first twelve charges, but acquitted him
on the final drug paraphernalia charge. R82-86. The trial court entered judgment,
sentencing Defendant to seven prison terms of five years to life on his distribution
charges; a prison term of one to fifteen years on the second degree felony possession
charge; a one-year jail term on the misdemeanor possession charge; and three oneyear jail terms on the drug paraphernalia charges. R20-22. He ordered that two of
the distribution sentences run consecutively and that the remainder of the terms run
concurrently. Id.
Defendant timely appealed. R18.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS1
On January 24, 2007, a group gathered for a party at Defendant's Panguitch
home. R381:15, 81 The group included Michelle (Hatch) Partridge; her cousin,
Ronnie Davenport; Defendant's former wife, Michel Clark Lamb; Michel's sister,
Stacy Clark; and Vance Brown. R381:82, 87, 90, 98. A "pipe was being passed
around," and "everybody was getting high." R381:81.
Defendant drew a line of methamphetamine for Michelle (Hatch) Partridge,
who snorted it. R381:82. A few days later Michelle's probation officer, Reid Bean,
and a female officer conducted a urinalysis on Michelle. R381:82-83. The urinalysis
came back "dirty," and Michelle told Officer Bean and Sheriff James D. ("Danny)
Perkins about the party.

R38T.83.

She told them that "she had used

methamphetamine[] which had been given to her by [Defendant]." R381:15. She
testified at the preliminary hearing and at trial. She received no deal for testifying.
R381:83.
Michel Lamb went to the party "to drink some alcohol." R381:87. While she
was there, Defendant took her aside to talk and "broke out a methamphetamine

1

The facts are taken from the preliminary hearing. Defendant's motions to
suppress below argued the facts presented at that hearing. R190-96; 252-53.

4

pipe/7 R381:88. She ''took a hit of meth off of it with him in the bathroom/7 Id. She
later told Sheriff Perkins that she had used methamphetamine with Defendant.
R381:89, 91. She testified pursuant to an agreement that she would not be charged
for that conduct. R381:92.
Stacy Clark had known Defendant most of her life. R381:98. At the party,
Defendant "gave [her] a line of methamphetamine[] and then there was a pipe
sitting on the table/' R381:99. She snorted the line and smoked from the pipe. Id.
The next day she returned to Defendant's house and "did another line of
"methamphetamine[]" that she got from Defendant. R381:100. A few days later, on
January 28, Defendant called and then met her at the city dump. R381:101. He gave
her "a line of methamphetamine[]" and "another line to take with [her], put in a
dollar bill." R381:102.
On February 9, Stacy made "a distress call" to Sheriff Perkins. R381:15. She
had not used methamphetamine between 2003 and 2007. R381:107. "[She] was very
depressed after using [methamphetamine] again and [she had] taken an overdose of
[Prozac]." R381-.105. She told the sheriff about the overdose. R381:18. He
"dispatched emergency personnel and then ... traveled to her home." R381:18. She
told him that Defendant had given her methamphetamine on January 24 and that
"she was ashamed of herself that she'd relapsed." R381:19.

5

Defendant also gave methamphetamine to Jeff Burton. Jeff had known
Defendant his whole life. R381:lll. Jeff had been convicted of methamphetamine
use and was on parole on February 28, 2007. R381:110. That day he was given a
urinalysis, which gave negative results. Id. Immediately following the test, he went
to Defendant's house "[t]o return some CD's that [Defendant] had [him] burn/'
R381:lll. While there, Defendant got methamphetamine from the counter and
loaded up a pipe. Id. He offered some to Jeff. Id. They smoked the pipe together.
Id. The following day, probation officer Reid Bean, who had learned of Jeff s trip to
Defendant's house, required him to submit to another urinalysis. R381:21,112. This
test came back positive. R381:113.
Jeff then met with Sheriff Perkins. Id. He told the sheriff that Defendant had
given him methamphetamine on February 28 and that he had smoked it at
Defendant's house. R381:24. The sheriff made a deal with him. R381:113. The
sheriff asked him "to report to us if there was any more methamphetamine[] offered
to him by [Defendant]." R381:38. Jeff could either testify against Defendant or deal
with the consequences of his own drug use and parole violation. R381:113.
On March 6, Jeff went to Defendant's house to take him more CDs. Id. He
told Defendant that he had the CDs, and Defendant reached into his pocket and put
methamphetamine on the seat of Jeff's car. R381:114-15. Defendant told Jeff that he
had "three boulders." R381:115. After meeting with Defendant, Jeff immediately
6

called Sheriff Perkins. R381:115. They met, and Jeff gave the methamphetamine to
the sheriff. Id.
Sheriff Perkins then contacted Officer Kevin Moore. R381:27. He told Officer
Moore that "if he happened to see [Defendant], to go ahead and pull him over and
detain him until —you know, let [the sheriff] know that he had pulled him over/'
R381:27. The sheriff "was going to get a warrant for [Defendant's] vehicle and his
person." R381:63. A little later, Officer Moore saw Defendant in his vehicle near
Main Street and 100 North. R381:62. Officer Moore turned on his red lights, and
Defendant pulled over. Id. Officer Moore had Defendant shut off and get out of the
truck. R381:62-63. He then "pat[ted] [Defendant] down for weapons" and "placefd]
some handcuffs on him for his safety and for [Officer Moore's] safety." Id. Sheriff
Perkins then came by and told Officer Moore "to stay there with [Defendant] and
just detain him for a minute," while the sheriff went to see the county attorney.
R381:63. Officer Moore detained Defendant for ten or fifteen minutes. Id.
The sheriff then called Officer Moore and told him to go ahead and arrest
Defendant. Id.; R381:27. The sheriff felt he had probable cause to believe that
Defendant had "distributed methamphetamine[] just a few minutes—just a little
while earlier." R381:27. The sheriff also said that he "was going to get a warrant for
[Defendant's] home and his vehicle and bodily fluids." Id.
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Officer Moore told Defendant about the conversation with the sheriff, read
him his Miranda rights, and patted him down—"searched him to take him to the
jail." R381:63. Officer Moore found a canister containing two or three small rocks of
methamphetamine in Defendant's pocket. R381:64-65. He impounded the vehicle,
which was towed to the sally port at the jail. R381:65, 70. Officer Moore, Deputy
Pollock, and Trooper Keyser then "did an inventory on the vehicle." R381:65.
During the inventory they found another canister, a cappuccino canister that
contained a green, leafy substance that later testing identified as marijuana.
R381:66-67.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Defendant claims that Officer Kevin Moore arrested him in violation of his
Fourth Amendment rights because Officer Moore effected the arrest before Sheriff
James Perkins authorized him to do so. This Court should decline review of the
claim, as Defendant has provided no authority and no reasoned analysis to support
a claim that the lawfulness of an arrest depends on a superior's authorizing it.
While the State disputes Defendant's claim that the initial detention here was an
arrest, it does not matter whether it was an arrest or merely a stop, as Office Moore
had probable cause to justify an arrest.
2. Defendant claims that an error may have occurred during voir dire, asserts
that the record is insufficient to permit a review of this claim, and therefore argues
8

for reversal based on the possibility that error occurred.

Defendant, as the

appellant, has the burden and duty to support his allegations with an adequate
record. But he has not presented a record adequate to permit review of this claim,
and this Court should therefore decline to review it.
ARGUMENT
I.
THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO ADDRESS
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT
IMPROPERLY DENIED HIS MOTION TO SUPPRESS,
BECAUSE THE CLAIM IS INADEQUATELY BRIEFED; IN ANY
CASE, PROBABLE CAUSE JUSTIFIED OFFICER MOORE'S
DETENTION AND SEARCH OF DEFENDANT
Defendant claims that his detention was a de facto arrest. Br. Appellant at 9.
He argues that the sheriff had only authorized Officer Moore to make a detention.
Id. As a consequence, he asserts that Officer Moore's actions were unauthorized and
unreasonable and that the de facto arrest therefore violated his constitutional rights.
Id. Defendant elaborates, "In other words, [Officer Moore] expanded what was
intended to merely be an investigative detention, into an arrest, without a
reasonable and legally sufficient justification; indeed since [Officer Moore] did not
intend to arrest the Defendant (even though he in fact had done so), there is no
justification posited by [Officer Moore], let alone a reasonable and legally sufficient
one." Id. at 9-10. Defendant claims that the methamphetamine found on Defendant
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when he was searched was "fruit of the poisonous tree" and should have been
excluded. Id. at 9.
Because Defendant's claim is inadequately briefed, this Court should not
review it.

In any case, the constitutional question is not whether an arrest is

authorized by an officer's superior; rather, the question is whether there is a
reasonable basis for the detention, i.e., reasonable suspicion to justify a level one
detention, or probable cause to justify a level two detention. State v. Prows, 2007 UT
App 409, \ 4 n.3,178 P.3d 908 (citing State v. Alvarez, 2006 UT 61, \ 10,147 P.3d 425).
A. Defendant's claim is inadequately briefed.
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires an appellant to
provide developed argument containing "the contentions and reasons ... with
respect to the issues presented ... with citations to authorities, statutes, and the parts
of the record relied on." Utah appellate courts also have cautioned that an appellant
cannot use the court as "'a depository in which [the appellant] may dump the
burden of argument and research'" Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, 1 9, 194 P.3d 903
(quoting Smith v. Four Comers Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 2003 UT 23,146,70 P.3d 904).
Thus, "[i]mplicitly," this rule "requires not just bald citation to authority but
development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority." State
v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). In short, this Court "will not engage in
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constructing arguments 'out of whole cloth7 on behalf of defendants/' State v. Webb,
790 P.2d 65, 71 n.2 (Utah App. 1990) (citation omitted).
Consequently, when the appellant fails to present any relevant authority, this
Court will "decline to find it for him." State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, f 12, 69 P.3d
1278. Similarly, "[w]hen a party fails to offer any meaningful analysis regarding a
claim, [this Court will] decline to reach the merits." State v. Garner, 2002 UT App
234, Tf 12, 52 P.3d 467. Rather, this Court will simply "decline to consider
inadequately briefed arguments." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539,549 (Utah App. 1998);
see also State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170,113, 72 P.3d 138.
Here, Defendant claims that Sheriff Perkins had not authorized Officer Moore
to arrest Defendant and that consequently the alleged arrest was unreasonable and
unconstitutional. Br. Appellant at 9. Defendant cites to no legal authority for his
argument that an arrest made without a superior's authorization is unreasonable
and unconstitutional. In making his claim, Defendant cites to four cases, but none
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of them address his lack-of-authorization claim.2 Thus, he has failed to cite relevant
authority and failed to offer any meaningful analysis regarding his claim. This
Court should therefore decline to review it.3

2

He cites State v. Amirkhizl, 2004 UT App 324, 100 P.3d 225, for the
proposition that "[a]n illegal arrest cannot support a search incident to arrest"; State
v. Deherrera, 965 P.2d 501, 505 (Utah App. 1998), and United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 347 (1974), for the proposition that "[t]he exclusionary rule requires
exclusion of evidence" obtained pursuant to an illegal search or seizure; and Covey
v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380, ]f 21,80 P.3d 553, for its definition of harmless error. Br.
Appellant at 10-11.
3

Defendant's claim is not only inadequately briefed; it is also unpreserved. It
is well settled that "claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, | 11,10 P.3d 346. "To preserve an issue for
appeal, a defendant must enter an objection on the record that is both timely and
specific." State v. Garner, 2008 UT App 32, f 11,177 P.3d 637 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). "The objection must be specific enough to give the trial
court notice of the very error7 of which [the party] complains." Id. (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). This preservation rule "applies to every claim,
including constitutional questions." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11,10 P.3d 346.
Defendant filed two motions to suppress below and two memoranda in
support of his motion. See Rl90-97; 252-56. The memoranda argue that the stop and
arrest were unsupported by probable cause, but not for the reasons set forth on
appeal. They do not argue, as Defendant does on appeal, that the arrest was
unwarranted because unauthorized by a superior. See id. Thus, Defendant did not
preserve his lack-of-authorization claim. Moreover, as he argues no justification for
review of his unpreserved claim, this Court should decline to review it. See State v.
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995).
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B. Defendant cannot prevail on his claim, because whether the
sheriff did or did not authorize the arrest is irrelevant to the
lawfulness of the search and seizure.
Defendant claims that he was unlawfully seized and searched when Officer
Moore detained and handcuffed him because the sheriff had not, at that point,
authorized the search. See Br. Appellant at 1, 9-11. He argues, "Because [Officer
Moore's] actions went beyond, and were more intrusive and restrictive upon the
Defendant, th[a]n his intent and his instructions from the Sheriff—because he
arrested the Defendant without the determination by the Sheriff and despite the
actual intent to merely detain him—the Deputy's actions were unauthorized,
unreasonable, and constitute a violation of the Defendant's constitutional protection
against unreasonable search and seizure, per the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution/'4 Id. at 9.
Whether the sheriff had or had not authorized the arrest is irrelevant to his Fourth
Amendment claim. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,375 n.l (2007) (concluding that
an officer's seizing a fleeing and dangerous motorist by ramming his car was
4

Defendant has also inadequately briefed his state constitutional claim. He
has not offered any "unique state constitutional analysis" in his brief to this Court,
instead only offering "cursory references to the state constitution within arguments
otherwise dedicated to a federal constitutional claim." State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47,
% 18-19,164 P.3d 397. Therefore, his state constitutional claim is not properly before
this Court.
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objectively reasonable, and observing that it was "irrelevant to [the court's Fourth
Amendment] analysis whether [the officer] had permission to take the precise
actions he took").
C. Probable cause justified Officer Moore's detention of
Defendant
Defendant claims that he was arrested when Officer Moore detained and
handcuffed him while the sheriff went to seek arrest and search warrants. See Br.
Appellant at 8-9. But Officer Moore stated that he did not arrest Defendant until
about fifteen minutes later, when Sheriff Perkins called back to tell him to go ahead
and make the arrest. R381:27.
The State disputes Defendant's claim that the arrest occurred when Officer
Moore handcuffed him.5 But whether the arrest occurred after Sheriff Perkins told

5

Contrary to Defendant's arguments, Br. Appellant at 8, the mere fact that
the Officer Moore handcuffed him did not convert the temporary stop into an
arrest. At least nine federal courts of appeal, including the Tenth Circuit, have
determined that intrusive precautionary measures, such as using handcuffs or
placing suspects on the ground, "do not necessarily turn a lawful Terry stop into
an arrest under the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455,
1463 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Merkley, 988 F.2d 1062,1064 (10th Cir.
1993) (display of firearms and use of handcuffs); United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d
1088 (7th Cir. 1993) (handcuffs); United States v. Saffeels, 982 F.2d 1199,1206 (8th
Cir. 1992) (handcuffs), judgment vacated on other grounds, 510 U.S. 801 (1993);
United States v. Esieke, 940 F.2d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1991) (handcuffs and leg irons);
United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 329 (4th Cir. 1989) (handcuffs); United

(Footnote continues on following page.)
14

Officer Moore to detain Defendant, or later after the Sheriff told Officer Moore to
make the arrest, is immaterial, where police had probable cause to justify an arrest
at either point.
An officer has probable cause to justify an arrest where the "facts and
circumstances within the officer's knowledge ... are sufficient to warrant a prudent
person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that
the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense/7 State v.
Tram, 2002 UT 97, \ 27, 57 P.3d 1052 (citing Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36
(1979)). Where probable cause exists, an officer may make the arrest even without a
warrant.

United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 427 (1976) ("[T]he Fourth

Amendment permits a duly authorized law enforcement officer to make a
warrantless arrest in a public place/'). 6

States v. Kapperman, 764 F.2d 786, 790 n.4 (11th Cir. 1985) (placing suspect in
police car in handcuffs); United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 1983)
(making suspect lie on ground in handcuffs); and additional unpublished
decisions).
6

The officer may make the warrantless arrest "even though he had adequate
opportunity to procure a warrant after developing probable cause for arrest/ 7
Watson, 423 US. at 427.

15

In addition, under the "collective knowledge doctrine" or the "fellow officer
rule," it is not necessary that the objective basis for a stop or arrest be based
"solely on the knowledge of [a] detaining officer. Rather, the collective knowledge
doctrine allows ... [it] to be based on the totality of the circumstances and 'the
collective knowledge of all the officers involved. 7 " Prows, 2007 UT App 409, ^ 13,
(addressing knowledge supporting reasonable suspicion to support a felony stop);
see also United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111 (1965) (recognizing observations
of fellow officers form reliable basis to support probable cause to arrest). A seizure
may "survive the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches and
seizures if performed by an officer who objectively relies on information, bulletins,
or flyers received from other law enforcement sources." State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274,
1276-77 (Utah App. 1994) (addressing investigative stops).
Here, Sheriff Perkins had probable cause to justify an arrest both at the time
he first told Officer Moore to detain Defendant and when he later called Officer
Moore to tell him to go ahead and make the arrest. Before Officer Moore stopped
Defendant, at least four people had told the sheriff that Defendant had distributed
methamphetamine to them in the six-week period preceding the arrest. See R381:15,
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24,89-91,98-102.7 Two of them had told the sheriff that Defendant had distributed
to them on multiple occasions during this time frame. See R381:24, 98-102,114-15.
One of them, Jeff Burton, called and met the sheriff immediately after Defendant
gave him methamphetamine on the day of the alleged arrest. R381:115. Burton
gave the sheriff the methamphetamine that he had received and told the sheriff that
Defendant had three more "boulders" of methamphetamine on his person.
R3891:115. Based on this information, the sheriff had probable cause to believe that
Defendant had committed numerous distribution offenses, that he had just
distributed again, and that he was at the time in possession of methamphetamine.
Thus, the sheriff had probable cause both when he first told Officer Moore to detain
Perkins and also when, after visiting with the county attorney, he told Officer Moore
to go ahead and make the arrest.
In addition, under the collective knowledge doctrine, Officer Moore was
entitled to rely on the circumstances and facts known to Sheriff Perkins. Because the

7

Moreover, even though at least two of these people had received favorable
treatment for their cooperation, which could cause "some doubt as to [their]
motives," their "detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with [their]
statements] that the event[s] were observed first hand, entitle[d] [their] tip[s] to
greater weight than might otherwise be the case." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,233
(1983).
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facts known to the sheriff supported probable cause to believe that Defendant had
committed and was committing drug offenses, they also provided probable cause to
justify Officer Moore's arresting Defendant.
D. Defendant's claim that the trial court should have suppressed
the evidence found on his person was relevant only to his
conviction on Count 8. Even if he could prevail on his claim, it
would not affect his convictions on the other eleven counts.
Defendant claims that Officer Moore arrested him without authority and that
the methamphetamine found in his pocket following the arrest should have been
suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. Br. Appellant at 9-10. But even if
Defendant could prevail on that claim, the methamphetairdne taken from his pocket
supported only one of the charged counts — count 8. Defendant has not argued nor
established that admission of that evidence affected his convictions on the other
counts. See Br. Appellant at 7-11.
First, Defendant has not argued that any evidence found during the inventory
search of his truck — the marijuana found in the cappuccino canister and the canister
itself and the brass and glass pipes that it held — should have been excluded. See id.
He does not argue that the offenses based on his possession of these items should be
reversed. See id. And he does not argue that the distribution offenses underlying
counts 1 to 7 should be reversed. See id. Nor should he. The information and
evidence supporting the' guilty verdicts on these offenses — the testimony of the
individuals who received the marijuana and the rock of methamphetamine given to
18

Jeff Burton—was given to the sheriff before the sheriff asked Officer Moore to detain
Defendant and was independent of anything found during the detention. See
R381:15, 24, 89-102,114-15.
For these reasons, the trial court properly denied Defendant's motions to
suppress. See R103-04; 233-39. And even assuming the trial court erred when it
denied the motion to suppress the cocaine found on Defendant's person at the time
he was stopped and then arrested, that error would only have affected the
admissibility of the evidence obtained on Defendant's person—evidence relevant
only to the conviction on count 8.
II.
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE A RECORD TO
SUPPORT HIS VOIR DIRE CLAIM
Defendant claims that the record is inadequate to provide review of a
potential voir dire claim and that his convictions should therefore be reversed. See
Br. Appellant at at 11-13. In making his claim, Defendant disregards his burden to
present an adequate record on appeal.
Parties claiming error on appeal have a duty and responsibility to support
their allegations with an adequate record. See State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120, 131
(Utah App. 1997). "'This Court simply cannot rule on a question which depends for
its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the record.'" Id. (quoting State v.
Barella, 714 P.2d 287,288 (Utah 1986) (additional quotation omitted)). In the face of
19

"an [in]adequate record on appeal, this Court must assume the regularity of the
proceedings below." State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403,405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); State
v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688,699 (Utah App. 1995) (assuming regularity of proceedings
below because appellant failed to include transcript on appeal); see also State v.
Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982) (the appellate court "cannot rule on a
question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the
record").
Where "the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is
unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the
record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion." Utah R.
App. P. 11(e)(2). "Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct
appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript." Id.
"When the certified record is incomplete, rule 11 'establishes a procedure for
supplementing the record when necessary/" Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health
Or., 2003 UT 23, f 33, 70 P.3d 904 (quoting Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d
1356, 1359 (Utah Ct.App.1991)). "'[A] motion under Rule 11(h) is appropriate ...
when the record must be augmented because of an omission or exclusion, or a
dispute as to the accuracy of reporting/" Id. (quoting Olson, 815 P.2d at 1359) (citing
State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 478-79 & n. 17 (Utah 1990)).
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Here, after receiving the trial transcript and before filing his Brief of
Appellant, Defendant had notice that the voir dire portion of the trial proceedings
had been not been included in the trial transcript. See R384:5 (trial transcript filed in
appellate court on August 31, 2009); Br. Appellant at 13 (filed on November 12,
2009). But Defendant, who had the burden to present an adequate record to support
review, did not file a motion under rule 11(h), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to
supplement the record with the omitted material. Defendant did not move to
supplement the proceedings; did not demonstrate that a transcript of the missing
voir dire proceedings had not been made or could not be made; and, even assuming
that a transcript had not been and could not be made, did not demonstrate that the
missing portions of the record could not be adequately reconstructed.

See Br.

Appellant at 11-13. Instead, he simply speculated that the missing transcript might
have provided grounds for a claim on appeal "that certain jurors should have been
stricken/ / See id. at 12.
Where Defendant has not presented an adequate record on appeal or shown
that the record cannot be presented, this Court must presume the regularity of the
proceedings below. See Miller, 781 P.2d at 405; Barella, 714 P.2d at 288; Wujfenstein,
657 P.2d at 293; Snyder, 932 P.2d at 131; Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at 699.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted March |5 , 2010.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

JEANNE B. INOUYE

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
GARFIELD COUNTY
55 South Main Street, Panguitch, Utah 84759
Telephone: (435) 676-8826; Facsimile: (435) 676-8239

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs.
MARK TALBOT,

Case No. 071600017
Judge. David L. Mower

Defendant.

THIS MATTER came before the Court on August 22, 2008, for Sentencing stemming
from a jury conviction which wras handed down on June 3, 2008 The State of Utah was
represented by Barry L. Huntington, Garfield County Attorney. The Defendant was present with
Cathy Johnstone, Public Defender. The Court reviewed the convictions against the defendant
and discussed with counsel sentencing recommendations. The Court also heard a statement from
the defendant.
BASED ON THE FOREGOING, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED AS FOLLOWS:
SENTENCE. On Counts 1 through 3, DISTRIBUTION OF OR ARRANGING TO

DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (METHAMPHETAMINE) (PRIOR), first
degree felonies, the defendant is sentenced to five (5) years to life in the Utah State Prison. No
fine was imposed. The sentence shall run concurrently.
On Count 4, DISTRIBUTION OF OR ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (METHAMPHETAMINE) (PRIOR), a first degree felony,
the defendant is sentenced to serve five(5) years to life in the Utah State Prison. No fine was
imposed. This sentence shall run consecutively.
On Count 5, DISTRIBUTION OF OR ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (METHAMPHETAMINE) (PRIOR), a first degree felony,
the defendant is sentenced to serve five(5) years to life in the Utah State Prison. No fine was
imposed. This sentence shall run consecutively.
Counts 6 and 7, DISTRIBUTION OF OR ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (METHAMPHETAMINE) (PRIOR), first degree felonies,
the defendant is sentenced to serve five (5) years to life in the Utah State Prison. No fine was
imposed. This sentence shall run concurrently.
Count 8, POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (D.F.Z.,
METHAMPHETAMINE), a second degree felony, the defendant is sentenced to serve one (1)
to fifteen (15) years in the Utah State Prison. No fine was imposed. This sentence shall run
concurrently.
State of Utah v. Talbot
Case No. 071600017
Judgment
Page 2 of 4

Count 9, POSSESSION OF USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (D.F.Z.,
MARIJUANA), a class A misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to serve one (1) year in the
Garfield County jail. However, this sentence shall be served in the Utah State Prison and the
sentence shall run concurrently.
Counts 10-12 POSSESSION OR USE OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, (D.F.Z), class
A misdemeanors, the defendant is sentenced to serve three one (1) year terms in the Garfield
County jail. However, this sentence shall be served in the Utah State Prison and the sentence
shall run concurrently.
The Board of Pardons and Parole is directed to note the defendant has serve 480 days in
the Garfield County Jail.
The defendant wras remanded to the custody of the Garfield County Sheriff pending
transportation to the Utah State Prison.
RIGHT TO MOVE TO APPEAL: The defendant is notified that he has 30 days from
the date hereof in which to move to appeal the sentence of the Court.
Signed on
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DISTRICT COURT, GARFIELD COUNTY, UTAH
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55 SOUTH MAIN STREET
PANGUITCH, UTAH 84759
Telephone: 435-676-1104 Fax: 435-676-8239

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE

vs.
Case No. 071600017

MARK D.TALBOT,
Assigned Judge: DAVID L.MOWER

Defendant
On January 21,2008, Defendant filed his Motion to Suppress Evidence. The State filed
its Objection on January 23,2008. Defendant did not reply. The State submitted this Motion for
a decision on January 31,2008. Neither party requested a hearing. This Motion is now ready for
a decision.
DECISION
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence should be denied.
ANALYSIS
As a preliminary matter, Defendant's memorandum in support of his Motion to Suppress
is not in compliance with the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12(d)(3). Rule 12(d)(3)
requires that a motion to suppress include "sufficient legal and factual grounds." Defendant's
memorandum includes neither a statement of facts nor citations to legal authorities. This made it
a lot more difficult to analyze and to consider Defendant's Motion.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS, Case number 071600017,
Page - 2 The State opposes Defendant's Motion on the ground that it is too late. The jury trial in
this matter is scheduled for February 13, 2008 through February 15,2008. The State argues that
the Defendant's Motion came too close to the trial.
Under Rule 12(c)(1)(B), Defendant must file a motion to suppress at least five days prior
to trial. Defendant is in compliance with this rule. Defendant's Motion should be considered on
its merits.
Defendant seeks to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of a search warrant and
arrest of the Defendant
Defendant argues that the search warrant affidavit did not state sufficient facts to support
probable cause for issuance of a search warrant. Defendants points to the following flaws in the
affidavit. First, the affidavit contains a statement that the Defendant was previously convicted of
similar offense in 2002 and served time in prison. ^13. Defendant believes this statement is
prejudicial and does not aid in the finding of probable cause.
Second, the affidavit failed to include information that a urine test to detect
methamphetamine is ineffective after three days.
Third, the affidavit is based on stale information, which does not support a finding of
probable cause.
Fourth, the affidavit lacks allegations about specific items to be found in specific places.
Defendant also challenges the propriety of his arrest on the basis that no crime was
committed in the presence of a police officer at the time of the arrest.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS, Case number 071600017,
Page - 3 A.

Sufficiency of the Search Warrant Affidavit
In determining the existence of probable cause, the Court must examine the search

warrant affidavit under a "totality-of-the-circumstances" test. State v. Saddler, 104 P3d 1265,
1268-69 (Utah 2004). The Court must reach a "practical... [and] common-sense decision" that
"given all the circumstances, there is a fair probability that the contraband will be found in the
place described." Id. Among other factors, the Court considers reliability of the informants, their
veracity, basis of knowledge, and corroboration by the police of the information received. Id.
The affidavit contains references to statements by four individuals that they had been
given methamphetamine by the Defendant on January 24,2007 and that they had used it in the
Defendant's home on that date. W~7. The individuals made those statements on the following
dates: Michelle Partridge on January 26, 2007; Ronald Davenport on February 6,2007; Stacy
Clark on February 9,2007; and Michelle Clark on February 10,2007. Id.
Further, a testifying police officer received a phone call on March 1,2007 from a
concerned neighbor about people visiting Defendant's house at odd hours and for short periods
of time. Search Warrant Affidavit, ^[8. In his experience, such activity is consistent with drug use
or sales. Id.
On March 1,2007, a confidential informant told the police that he had used
methamphetamine with the Defendant at the Defendant's house on February 28,2007. Id., ^[9.
This confidential informant gave a urine sample, which tested positive for methamphetamine. Id.

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS, Case number 071600017,
Page - 4 The same confidential informant told the police that he received methamphetamine from
the Defendant on March 6,2007. Id., IflO. Fifteen minutes after receiving this information, the
police met with the confidential informant. Id., fll 1. The informant gave them a white rock
substance, which appeared to be methamphetamine. Id.
The affidavit explains that the statements made by the above mentioned' individuals are
reliable because these individuals are familiar with methamphetamine and with its users,
producers, and distributors. Id., ^J3.
Based on this information, Defendant was arrested on March 6,2007. He was searched.
Two large white rocks that appeared to be methamphetamine were found in his pocket. Id., T|I2.
I conclude that the affidavit contains sufficient facts to support a finding of probable
cause. The information about drug activity in the Defendant's home came from five individuals.
They each independently stated that the Defendant supplied them with methamphetamine on
January 24,2007, February 28,2007, and March 6,2007.
The police also received methamphetamine from the confidential informant on March 6,
2007 fifteen minutes after the drug transaction between the confidential informant and the
Defendant
In addition, there was information received from a concerned citizen that suspicious
activity was going on at the Defendant's residence. A concerned citizen's testimony is presumed
to be reliable and honest State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284,287-88 (Utah App. 1990).

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS, Case number 071600017,
Page - 5 Finally, at the time of the Defendant's arrest, police found methamphetamine on his
person.
Under a totality-of-circumstances test, the affidavit provides probable cause to issue a
warrant to search the Defendant's residence and to seize the Defendant's bodily fluids.
Defendant argues that the affidavit failed to include the information that a urine test to
detect methamphetamine is not effective after three days. The statement from the confidential
informant was that the Defendant used methamphetamine on February 28,2007. The search
warrant was issued on March 6,2007. Defendant claims that on March 6,2007, a urine test was
unnecessary because no methamphetamine couid be detected at that time.
Generally, the Court must examine the affidavit within its four corners. However, in some
circumstances a defendant may be entitled to bring in extraneous information to challenge the
validity of a search warrant Such circumstances exist when (1) an affiant made a false statement
(in this case omission) intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth; and (2)
the affidavit is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause after the misstatement is set
aside or omission is inserted. State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188,191 (Utah 1986).
In this case, the affidavit does not become insufficient if the omitted information is
inserted. Even if a magistrate knew at the time of examining the affidavit that methamphetamine
stays in the system only for three days, there is a probable cause to conclude that the Defendant
may have used drugs after February 28,2007. Methamphetamine was found on the Defendant's

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS, Case number 071600017,
Page - 6 person at the time of arrest on March 6,2007. The search warrant for the search of the
Defendant's bodily fluids was also issued on that day.
Thus, the Defendant may not use extraneous information to challenge the affidavit in this
case.
The statement that the Defendant had been previously convicted of a similar offense does
not aid in the finding of probable cause. However, it also does not render this affidavit
insufficient. Thus, this argument has to be rejected.
Finally, the affidavit did not specify which particular items the police were looking for.
However, this deficiency is cured by a search warrant. A search warrant states that the police are
authorized to search for controlled substances and drug paraphernalia.
I conclude that the affidavit contains sufficient facts to support a finding of probable
cause. Evidence obtained as a result of a search warrant should not be suppressed.
B.

Arrest
Police must have probable cause in order to arrest an individual. Probable cause exists

when a police officer knows of the facts that are "sufficient... to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed." State v. Worwood, 164 P.3d
397,409^34 (Utah 2007).
Prior to the Defendant's arrest, the police had information from five different people
about drug distribution and use in the Defendant's home. Police also had a tip from a concerned
citizen about suspicious activity in the house. Finally, a confidential informant told the police

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS, Case number 071600017,
Page - 7 that he received methamphetamine from the Defendant and saw the Defendant use
methamphetamine on February 28,2007. Police received methamphetamine from this
confidential informant
These facts are sufficient to apprise a man of reasonable caution that an offense has been
committed. Thus, the police had probable cause to arrest the Defendant.
The evidence obtained as a result of the arrest should not be suppressed.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is denied.

David L
Mower
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STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON
SECOND MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE

vs.
Case No. 071600017

MARK D. TALBOT,
Assigned Judge D A V I D L. M O W E R

Defendant.
Defendant filed his Motion to Suppress on March 31. 2008. This is the second motion to
suppress. The State objected on April 10, 2008; and the Defendant replied on April 16, 2008.
The State then filed a Second Objection to Defense's Motion to Suppress Evidence on April 23,
2008!. Defendant's Motion to Suppress is now ready for a decision.
DECISION
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence should be denied.
ANALYSIS
Defendant filed his first motion to suppress on January 21, 2008. He raised two issues:
(1) sufficiency of a search warrant affidavit and (2) existence of probable cause for arrest.

1

1 do not consider this pleading in making a decision because it is not permitted by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 7(c)(1).
, im r w i s i o n 0 n second Motion To i
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MEMORANDUM DECISION ON SECOND MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE,
Case number 071600017,
Page - 2 The Court issued its Memorandum Decision on this motion on February 5, 2008. It was
determined that a search warrant affidavit was sufficient, and that the police had probable cause
to arrest the Defendant.
In the present Motion to Suppress, Defendant challenges the legality of his initial stop.
On March 6, 2007, Defendant was stopped while driving. He was searched and arrested.
Defendant argues that the police did not have a reasonable articulable suspicion that he had
committed or was about to commit a crime. State v Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994).
I have already determined that the police had probable cause to arrest the Defendant.
Consequently, the police also had reasonable articulable suspicion that the Defendant had
committed a crime.
Defendant's Motion to Suppress should be denied.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied.
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